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Income volatility is endemic in poor countries (Pritchett; 2000; Koren and Tenreyro; 2007).
During 1960-99, the median of the standard deviation of annual growth rates was more than
three times higher for low-income countries than for OECD member countries (Malik and
Temple; 2009). Governments in these countries often face severe ﬁscal constraints (Fallon and
Lucas; 2002) and the tightening of these constraints during economic downturns often leads
to cuts in state social spending (Lustig and Walton; 1998; Woo; 2005; Bhalotra; 2009; Loayza
et al.; 2007) in contrast to the tendency in richer countries for social spending to rise to smooth
over potential dips in household consumption (Lane; 2003). Poor households have limited
access to credit (Banerjee et al.; 2007) and formal insurance mechanisms such as unemployment
beneﬁts (van Ours and Vodopivec; 2006). As a result, even if income shocks are transitory,
they often have severe and irreversible consequences. They may throw families into poverty
traps, for example, through the co-dependence of wage income and adult health (e.g. Ray;
1998; Dasgupta; 1997; Eriksson et al.; 2005), raise the death toll amongst newborns (Baird
et al.; 2007; Bhalotra; 2009) or leave the survivors amongst exposed children scarred with the
prospect of greater later-life morbidity and lower educational attainment (van den Berg et al.;
2006; Ferreira and Schady; 2009).
A vast literature describes how households attempt to cope with idiosyncratic shocks
through asset decumulation or reliance upon informal insurance networks (Morduch; 1995; Sk-
ouﬁas; 2003). However many households have no assets to sell and risk pooling arrangements are
challenged by aggregate shocks that impose covariant risks on members (e.g. Townsend; 1995).
Households may then fall back on the one asset they have, which is their labour. Understand-
ing the dynamics of employment is therefore key to understanding the dynamics of poverty.
We focus upon women’s labour supply, investigating the extent to which it rises in economic
downturns and reverts in upturns. The hypothesis that counter-cyclical employment performs
an insurance function is further investigated by allowing interactions between aggregate shocks
and indicators of liquidity constraints at the household level. Even if women desire to increase
their work participation in downturns, they may be limited by a decline in labour demand. We
investigate transitions between unemployment and types of employment, illustrating the role of
self-employment. This exercise also illuminates the diﬀerences in employment behaviour that
we ﬁnd across the three developing country regions.
The stylized fact for richer countries is that women’s labour supply is pro-cyclical, rising in
upturns when the oﬀered wage is more likely to exceed the opportunity cost of women’s time;
for example, see Joshi (1981) for the UK, Killingsworth and Heckman (1987) for the US and
Darby et al. (2001) for other OECD countries. There is no stylized fact regarding the cyclicality
of women’s work in poorer countries. There is some evidence from historical data that women’s
2employment rose during periods of economic crises and industrial restructuring in 19th century
England (Anderson; 1974; Scott and Tilly; 1978, p. 144) and New England (Hareven; 1982,
1990; Lamphere; 1987). Scott and Tilly (1978, p. 144) argue that “the reallocation of women’s
labour between productive and reproductive work was part of a widespread economic adaptation
of households that emerged to maintain household living standards under restructured economic
conditions”. There is some compelling evidence that the economic crisis in 1997/8 in Indonesia
threw women into employment, even as male employment rates fell, and that the added women
workers were primarily in the informal sector (Thomas et al.; 2003, also see Section 5 below).
However, in terms of the proportional decline in average hourly wages, the Indonesian crisis
was as severe as the Great Depression of the 1930s in the US or the collapse of Soviet Union
in the early 1990s (Fallon and Lucas; 2002) and it is unclear how well these ﬁndings would
generalise to the case of smaller shocks or alternative institutional settings.
We use a micro-dataset of unprecedented scope in this literature that contains compa-
rable information on 1.1 million ever-married women (and a further 0.1 million never-married
women) of age 20-49 interviewed in 129 survey rounds conducted in 43 countries across 21 years,
1986-2006. The micro-data are merged by country and year of interview with cross-country
panel data on income (GDP) and other relevant macroeconomic variables. The macro-panel
is exploited to create country-year speciﬁc indicators of the state of the business cycle. The
micro-data are exploited to investigate heterogeneity in the response parameters predicted by
theory, for example, with respect to wealth and the stage of the lifecycle (Gruber and Cullen;
1996; Attanasio et al.; 2005). We report a range of speciﬁcations designed to balance the trade-
oﬀ between robustness and eﬃciency that has been emphasised in the recent literature on
growth econometrics (Durlauf et al.; 2005) and explore robustness of the estimates to controls
for trended unobservables and country-year varying shocks.
The results show that economic ﬂuctuations are mirrored in signiﬁcant ﬂuctuations in
women’s work. The average tendency is for African women to fall out of employment in
recessions, presumably to a very vulnerable position. In contrast, Asian and Latin American
women’s employment increases in recessions and heterogeneity in the response parameter by a
number of individual characteristics indicates that this is part of a household coping strategy.
We suggest that amongst reasons that African women behave diﬀerently are that the conven-
tional family structure with income pooling is less the norm (Udry; 1996), opportunities for paid
employment are limited and aggregate income variation is more closely tied to rainfall variation
with the implication that income shocks strike the sector where women most naturally seek
employment (see Section 5.1). Economic ﬂuctuations generate considerable churning across
job types, which average employment rates mask. Downturns in Asia and Latin America are
associated with women moving from non-employment to both self employment and paid em-
ployment. In Africa, the important shifts are out of paid employment and into self-employment
3and non-employment.
Previous cross-sectional research shows that women’s labour supply tends to be U-shaped in
economic development (Schultz; 1988; Goldin; 1995; Mammen and Paxson; 2000). The upturn
at higher levels of development is thought to be driven by gains in women’s education and
the emergence, through structural change, of jobs “suitable” to women. The upturn at low
levels of development arises because families often need the income from women’s work, and
their participation is facilitated by the prevalence of family farms and enterprises. This paper
presents a dynamic and more disaggregate picture of life at the low end. On average about 50%
of women work in our sample of developing countries. The 50% who do not work include those
who are wealthier and/or married to educated men (income eﬀect) and those for whom the
opportunity cost of work is high because of high fertility (substitution eﬀect). Our estimates
show that transitory participation induced by the business cycle brings in a more diverse set
of women, including asset-poor, less educated, younger women with children under the age of
ﬁve. This invites consideration of the eﬀects that this has upon the timing of fertility and of
investments in children.
Studies of poverty dynamics have paid limited attention to the role of macroeconomic ﬂuc-
tuations (Baulch and Hoddinott; 2000; Ravallion; 2001) and studies of the eﬀects of macroe-
conomic crises on poverty in poorer countries have paid limited attention to the mediating
inﬂuence of labour market dynamics (Fallon and Lucas; 2002; Skouﬁas; 2003; Concei¸ c˜ ao et al.;
2009). This is topical given the ongoing world recession, thought to be the worst since the
Great Depression. Growth in developing countries was 1.2 percent in 2009, compared with 5.6
percent in 2008 (World Bank; 2010)1. In fact, developing countries have been routinely ravaged
by crises stimulated by natural disasters, wars, debt, commodity price shocks, ﬁnancial collapse
and the spread of HIV/AIDS. This paper is therefore more broadly relevant to growing interest
in the eﬀects of income volatility in poor countries (Koren and Tenreyro; 2007) and especially
its eﬀects on human capital investment at critical periods of childhood (Almond; 2006; Cunha
and Heckman; 2007; Ferreira and Schady; 2009; van den Berg et al.; 2009), in the transmission
of which women’s labour supply is an under-studied mechanism (Basu and Basu; 1991; Rose;
2000; Bhalotra; 2009; Ag´ enor and Ag´ enor; 2009).
2 Background
The motivating hypothesis is rooted in a literature on the added worker eﬀect (AWE) that origi-
nated around the Great Depression (see Humphrey; 1940; Woytinsky; 1940). This casts married
1Uncertainty concerning the likely impact on women’s labour market status is evident in the media, not
only for developing countries but also in, for example, the UK and the US (Appendix B includes some relevant
quotes from the media)
4women as secondary workers who temporarily increase labour supply when their husbands suf-
fer unemployment. The underlying theory is developed in Ashenfelter (1980), Heckman and
MaCurdy (1980), Lundberg (1985), Ehrenberg and Smith (2003) and Borjas (2005). In the
simple static model, women raise labour supply following a transitory dip in family income if
their leisure is a normal good and this eﬀect is enhanced if the increased non-market time of the
husband lowers the opportunity cost of market work for the wife through substitution in home
production. Given evidence that cross-substitution eﬀects are typically small, the AWE relies
upon wealth eﬀects. In a lifecycle setting, as long as the income loss from unemployment is
small relative to the husband’s lifetime earnings, AWE eﬀects are expected to be small and con-
centrated amongst families that face liquidity constraints or ﬁxed consumption commitments
(Mincer; 1962; Lundberg; 1985). Unemployment insurance in richer countries will tend to crowd
out any need for wives to provide insurance (Gruber and Cullen; 1996). Consistent with these
predictions, studies set in the US and UK ﬁnd small if any added worker eﬀects (Stephens;
2002). In aggregate data, the discouraged worker eﬀect tends to dominate and women’s work
is pro-cyclical (see references in the previous section).
As indicated earlier, there is typically no unemployment insurance in developing countries
and a vast fraction of households face subsistence constraints that they are not equipped to
borrow to smooth over. In this setting, we may expect to see dominant wealth eﬀects and, in the
aggregate, counter-cyclical labour supply, see, for example, Barzel and McDonald (1973) and
Stern (1984), who show the importance of asset levels and subsistence constraints in determining
the shape of the labour supply curve. The tendency for women in poorer countries to act as
secondary workers is likely to be strengthened by traditional family structures and low levels
of education and skill amongst women. The informal sector that characterises developing
countries facilitates transitory work spells as entry and exit barriers and search costs are low
(Basu et al.; 2000). The literature on household insurance mechanisms in developing countries
has considered child labour as an insurance mechanism (Jacoby and Skouﬁas; 1997; Skouﬁas;
2003) but it contains relatively limited investigation of the role of changes in women’s labour
supply.
3 Data and Descriptive Statistics
3.1 Data
The micro-data are assimilated from 153 Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS) conducted
using a similar questionnaire in 63 developing countries between 1986 and 2006. There are
no similar cross-country micro-data on employment and the DHS data have not been used for
this purpose before. The potential sample contains 1,777,063 observations on women’s work,
5education and demographics2. Countries and survey years in the sample are in Table 1. For
20 countries, only one survey is available. There are 13 countries with two surveys, 17 with
three, 9 with four and 4 with ﬁve. We group the countries into ﬁve regions, sub-Saharan Africa
(henceforth Africa), Asia, Latin America, the Middle East and North Africa and the former
USSR. About 33.5% of women in the sample are located in sub-Saharan Africa, 33.8% in Asia
and 22.8% in Latin America. Another 8% are in the Middle East and North Africa and 2% in
the former USSR. Although we present some results for the latter two, the discussion will refer
to the 90% of women in the three developing country regions and these are the regions that are
pooled for the estimation. We construct nine sub-regions within these three regions to capture
cultural and institutional heterogeneity (Table 1).
The surveys interview women of reproductive age, typically 15-49 years. We keep women
aged 20-49. Of the 153 surveys, 124 interview a representative sample of women. These
include all countries in Africa, Latin America and ex-USSR. In the other 29 surveys, which
pertain to 15 countries in Asia and the Middle East, the sample was restricted to ever-married
women (Table 1). The main analysis is on the sample of ever-married women although we allow
heterogeneity as a function of current marital status and fertility. There are no data on hours of
work or wages. Wage data for developing countries are not very useful given that unpaid work or
self-employment are widespread. The data contain information on the education of the woman
and her partner, and education may be thought of as an indicator of the permanent component
of individual wages. The business cycle variation that we analyse creates transitory variation in
wages and the speciﬁcations estimated will allow the impact of this on women’s employment to
vary with her education and that of her husband. Information on years of education is used to
construct dummy variables indicating whether the individual is uneducated (none), has some
education but less than secondary (some), or has completed secondary or higher education
(high). A household wealth index is constructed using data on ownership of assets and this is
used to create indicators for the quartile of the wealth distribution that the household falls into
(see the data appendix).
The microdata are merged by country and year of interview with country panel data on
GDP per capita in constant prices, inﬂation, terms of trade, indicators of ﬁnancial development,
rainfall and civil conﬂict. Deﬁnitions and sources of these variables are in the data appendix.
2See www.measuredhs.com where the data, documentation and reports are available by country. We have
harmonised the data across countries and survey years. For example, we have adjusted the dates in the Ethiopia
and Nepal surveys for the fact that they follow the Julian and the Nepali calendar (Vikram Samwat), respectively.
Details are in the data appendix.
63.2 Descriptive Statistics
This section proﬁle’s women’s employment in developing countries, providing what would ap-
pear to be the ﬁrst broadbrush sketch representative of developing countries. The distribution
of women in the sample by country and region is in Table 1 and distributions by sector of
employment and individual characteristics are in the data appendix. Summary statistics for all
variables analysed are in Table A3.
Averaging across the sample, about 49% of women work compared with about 98% of
men, so there is clearly less room for manoeuvre amongst men. The employment rate of
men does not vary much across regions, except that it is lower in the ex-USSR (Table A1).
Women’s employment exhibits considerable variation by region and characteristics (Tables 2
and A1). The employment rate of women aged 20-49 is 64% in Africa, 43% in Asia and 50% in
Latin America. Self employment dominates paid employment amongst African women but the
reverse is the case in Asia and Latin America (Table A2). The employment rate is U-shaped
in women’s education but decreases monotonically in their partner’s education (Table 2). The
between-country variation shows a signiﬁcantly negative relation between women’s work and
GDP (Figure 1). Plots of the between-country relationship by continent show that African
countries drive the overall negative relationship, the relationship being negative but ﬂatter in
Asia and positive in Latin America- and also in the Middle East and ex-USSR (Figure 2)3.
Pooling the within and between country variation (Table A1) we see a negative relation
between women’s employment and each of GDP and household wealth. A greater percentage
of women are employed in recessions as opposed to booms, 54% against 49%, while men’s
employment is similar in the two regimes (Tables 2 and A1). The relationship with GDP is
sharpest at the low end - the bottom 20% of country-year observations in the GDP distribution
are associated with sharply higher rates of employment (66%) than the rest of the distribution.
The relationship with household wealth is sharpest at the high end- women in the top quartile
of the household wealth distribution are much less likely to work (46%) than elsewhere in the
distribution. Women’s employment rates are 5 points higher in rural than in urban areas.
Overall, the correlations are consistent with the hypothesis that women are more likely to work
in poorer circumstances (indicated by partner’s education, wealth, GDP, rural), and we know
that incomes are more volatile in poorer circumstances.
The employment rate of unmarried women is 18 points higher than that of married women,
consistent with married women being secondary workers. Amongst married women, employ-
ment is 4 points lower if there is at least one child under the age of ﬁve in the household,
reﬂecting the widely established tendency for the opportunity cost of work to rise with fertil-
3Following Boserup (1970) seminal work describing how industrialization alters women’s traditional social
and productive roles, the literature documents a tendency for women’s participation to decline relative to men’s
(Scott; 1986).
7ity4 Employment rates are increasing in age (cohort), possibly reﬂecting the fact that younger
women are more likely to have young children at home. In Figure 3 we plot employment rates
for single mothers, single non-mothers and (currently) married mothers against GDP. Single
mothers are the most active group across income levels, consistent with their bearing the pri-
mary responsibility for dependents. It is striking that married women with children (in this
case not necessarily under the age of ﬁve) work more than single women at low but not at higher
levels of GDP. This is indicative of their employment being distress-driven. The correlations
in these data incorporate unobserved heterogeneity. The more formal analysis to follow uses
country and time variation in income to identify the extent to which the dynamics of women’s
work is driven by distress.
4 Model Speciﬁcation and Results
We model women’s employment as a function of business cycle variation which, it is implicit,
creates demand induced declines in the income of primary earners. Studies of the added worker
eﬀect have tended to model women’s work participation as a function of the labour market
status of their husbands (Lundberg; 1985; Stephens; 2002) but this encounters endogeneity and
selection problems (Gruber and Cullen; 1996) which the modelling of women’s employment as
a function of the business cycle avoids.. Our approach has the following further advantages.
First, it accommodates changes in earnings across multiple earners, which is pertinent given the
extended family structures in poorer countries. A father-in-law or a brother-in-law may well
be the main earner and if, say, recessions induce young men to enter the labour market early
or elderly men to delay retirement then in the antecedent model their labour supplies would
appear as omitted variables. Second, our approach captures the impact on women’s work not
only of unemployment amongst household members but also of under-employment and wage
decline. This is relevant in poorer countries where unemployment is unaﬀordable and hence
ill-deﬁned, and wages tend to carry most of the impact of economic crises (e.g. Thomas et al.;
2003). Also, using US data, Maloney (1987) shows that it is only once employment constraints
on the desired labour supply of both husband and wife are allowed that an added worker eﬀect
emerges. A third reason to prefer the direct modelling of aggregate income variation is that this
is empirically relevant given the considerable variation in developing countries (Section 1). It is
important to emphasise that we only seek to answer the question that the reduced form permits
4The labour economics literature focuses on substitution eﬀects created by fertility. In developing countries,
it is important to recognise that poor health and nutrition have productivity eﬀects (Fogel; 1994; Ray; 1998,
chapter 8) which, set against the labour intensity of home production may prohibit work participation. Women
may have to spend years in cycles of reproduction especially in areas of high mortality (Dasgupta; 1993, e.g.)
or many hours per day collecting ﬁrewood and water (Cain; 1986) or walking their children to faraway clinics
(Mwabu et al.; 1993).
8which is what the direction of cyclicality of women’s employment is. We do not attempt to tie
this in directly with the employment status of the husband.
The dependent variable in the analysis is an indicator for whether the woman reports work-
ing at the time of the survey5. Since employment in developing countries exhibits considerable
seasonal variability the pattern of which may diﬀer across space and time, we control in all
speciﬁcations for the quarter of interview of the individual woman. We also adjust annual
GDP data by the month of interview of the woman so that, for every woman, GDP refers to
GDP in the 12 months preceding her month of interview.
The data are microdata nested within a short and unbalanced country panel. The baseline
model incorporates country ﬁxed eﬀects and trends and consistently allows heterogeneity in the
income eﬀect by education and region (Section 4.1). To test the hypothesis that women who
have relatively limited alternative sources of insurance are more likely to exhibit counter-cyclical
employment, we exploit availability of individual data to model interactions of aggregate income
with proxies for the wealth and the consumption commitments of women, (Section 4.2). We
then investigate cyclical employment transitions across sectors (Section 4.3). The results are
subject to a range of robustness checks (Section 4.4), including adding controls for country-
speciﬁc shocks, varying functional form and allowing lagged eﬀects. We also estimate alternative
speciﬁcations that trade oﬀ controlling for cross-sectional unobserved heterogeneity against
reducing measurement error bias. The ﬁndings are woven into the discussion of methods that
follows. The results are set in relation to the available literature in Section 5.
4.1 Country Fixed Eﬀects
Individual employment is regressed upon country-speciﬁc log income (Ycgt), controlling for
individual characteristics, country ﬁxed eﬀects and country-speciﬁc trends:
Licgt = α + βYcgt + Xicgt γ + Zcgt θ + ηc + δ1c t + εicgt, (1)
Licgt is an indicator for whether woman i of country c in region g reports employment
when interviewed in year t. Country dummies comprehensively capture persistent institutional
and cultural determinants of women’s work, so that time-invariant omitted variables will not
bias the estimates even if they are correlated with the explanatory variables. Recall that the
country panel is unbalanced and contains irregular time intervals between observations once it
is matched into the microdata because the number of surveys and the spacing between surveys
varies across countries. The within-groups estimator is (unlike the ﬁrst diﬀerence estimator)
5Current employment is likely to be reported by women with little error. In contrast, labour force par-
ticipation and unemployment are notoriously diﬃcult concepts in developing countries. Since unemployment
insurance is scarce and job search is largely informal, it is uncommon to register participation or unemployment.
9robust to this; it simply translates each observation into deviations from the country mean.
The distance between observations (typically quinquennial) diminishes serial correlation in
the errors. Country trends control for trended unobservables. Controls, X, for individual
heterogeneity include dummy variables for the woman’s age cohort (20-24, 25-35, 36+), her
education (none, some, high), her current marital status, her partner’s education if she is
currently married, whether she is household head, the season of her interview, her rural/urban
location, the wealth quartile of her household and the number of children she has under the age
of ﬁve. Z includes the share of women of working age in the population and the inverse of the
urbanisation rate. These are not displayed in equation (1) but we also include interactions of
income with the index woman’s education and we estimate the equation not only for the entire
sample but also for each region. We estimate linear probability models and adjust the standard
errors for heteroskedasticity. The LPM is expected to behave well as the mean of the dependent
variable is close to 0.5. We nevertheless checked that there were few (1%) predictions outside
the 0-1 range, and that the marginal eﬀect from a probit (-0.07) is almost identical to the
LPM coeﬃcient A number of alternative speciﬁcations are investigated below. The estimation
sample pools data from the 43 countries with at least two survey rounds. It contains one million
women (n), 43 countries (N) and between 2 and 5 survey rounds (T).
Results are in Table 3. The average coeﬃcient for the sample of developing countries is
-0.074, which is signiﬁcant at the 1% level. So a recession involving a 10% drop in GDP is asso-
ciated with a 0.74% point increase in women’s employment. A one standard deviation change
in GDP in this sample is 6.3%, and our estimates predict that this would result in a 0.47%
point change in women’s employment. The average eﬀect is driven by the 87% of women with
less than secondary education, the employment of women with secondary or higher education
being acyclical on average. Disaggregating by region, we ﬁnd that women’s employment is
countercyclical in Asia (-0.13) and Latin America (-0.16) but that it is signiﬁcantly procyclical
in Africa (0.07), in each case for women at every educational level. The education gradient in
the coeﬃcient in each region indicates that cyclicality is weakest amongst women with at least
secondary education, consistent with their greater labour market attachment. Estimates for
Middle East-North Africa and for ex-USSR, in line with those for Asia and Latin America, are
negative. We suggest why Africa stands out in Section 5.1 below. Coeﬃcients on covariates
other than income are in Table A4
4.1.1 Country speciﬁc equations
Although we are able to control for individual heterogeneity and we have modelled heterogeneity
by region and by women’s education (and will extend this in Section 4.2), it is plausible that
there remains heterogeneity at the country level. If so, as the model is linear, the pooled
10coeﬃcient in equation (1) provides the average treatment eﬀect. In this section we show the
results of investigating heterogeneity across countries.For the thirteen countries for which T≥4,
we estimated country-speciﬁc equations as follows-
Lit = ˘ α + ˘ βYt + Xit ˘ γ + Zt ˘ θ + ˘ δ1 t + ˘ εit, (2)
These include country-speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀects (α) and country-speciﬁc trends as did equation 1
but are more general as they allow every parameter to be country-speciﬁc. To benchmark the
country-speciﬁc results, we ﬁrst present panel estimates of equation (1) using the (smaller)
sample of countries for which T≥4 (n=0.37m, N=13,), see panel B, Table 3. The income
coeﬃcients are more negative in this sub-sample, the average coeﬃcient being -0.17. The
pattern of results is as in panel A with the exception that African women now, on average,
exhibit countercyclical behaviour.
The country-speciﬁc results are in Table 4. The income coeﬃcient is signiﬁcantly negative
in eight of the thirteen countries, insigniﬁcant in three and signiﬁcantly positive in two. It is
negative in every Asian and Latin American country in the sample. The two countries that
exhibit pro-cyclical employment (Ghana and Zimbabwe) and two of the three with insigniﬁcant
coeﬃcients (Mali and Uganda) are in Africa. The remaining two African countries in this
sample, Kenya and Senegal, show a signiﬁcantly negative coeﬃcient. The greater heterogeneity
within Africa implies that the sign of the pooled coeﬃcient for Africa will be sensitive to the
country composition of the sample (as we have seen) and to the strength of controls for regional
heterogeneity (as we shall see in Section 4.4.2).
4.2 Gradients of the Relationship
This section investigates whether evidence of counter-cyclical employment is stronger amongst
women who have relatively limited alternative sources of insurance against income shocks. The
baseline equation is augmented to include interactions of income with indicators of this (W),
namely, marital status, partner’s education, household wealth, land ownership, rural location,
and the presence of at least one child under the age of ﬁve. We also allow the income eﬀect to
vary by cohort, disaggregating cohorts by education and fertility.
Licgt = ˆ α + ˆ βYcgt + φ(Ycgt ∗ Wicgt) + ωWicgt + Xicgt ˆ γ + Zcgt ˆ θ + ˆ ηc + ˆ δ1c t + ˆ εicgt, (3)
We present average coeﬃcients for the entire developing country sample and estimate the
equation for each of the three regions. The average coeﬃcient can be misleading because it
often averages over negative coeﬃcients in Asia and Latin America and a positive coeﬃcient
11in Africa. Dividing the sample of ever-married women into those who are married at the
time that the employment information is recorded (90%) and those who are not, we ﬁnd that
married women’s employment is more sensitive to the cycle, which is consistent with their
being secondary workers in the household6 Amongst married women, those whose husbands
have secondary or higher education (21%) exhibit the weakest counter-cyclicality, consistent
with husband’s education being a proxy for his permanent earnings (Table 5). The strength of
the counter-cyclical response is decreasing in household wealth and is weaker in households that
own agricultural land (30%) (Table 6). All of these patterns hold on average and in each of Asia
and Latin America. We ﬁnd that pro-cyclical behaviour in Africa is stronger amongst women
who are currently married, have well educated husbands and wealth in the upper quartiles
of the distribution. This is consistent with the more constrained women being more likely to
be permanent or primary workers. The one exception to this pattern is that African women
who do not own land and, by that criterion, are more likely to be constrained, exhibit greater
pro-cyclicality. Rural women in Asia exhibit greater sensitivity to cyclical variation than urban
women, possibly because their incomes are relatively volatile and credit and insurance are
harder to access. As with the other interactions for Africa, the more constrained (rural) women
exhibit weaker pro-cyclicality (Table 7). The rural and urban coeﬃcients are similar in Latin
America.
In Asia and Latin America, ever-married women with at least one child under the age
of 5 (64%) at the time of the survey are more responsive to cyclical variation than women
without (Table 7). This interaction eﬀect is as we may expect if dependent children raise
the subsistence requirements of the household and women with young children are secondary
workers. The latter is suggested by the direct eﬀect of this indicator of fertility being negative,
that is, income-constant, women with a young child are less likely to work, just like women the
world over (e.g. Angrist and Evans; 1998). In Africa, women with young children show weaker
pro-cyclicality7. The results so far can be summarised as showing that in the regions where
counter-cyclicality is evident, it is stronger amongst women who have higher consumption
and time commitments (young children), lower non-labour income (marital status, marital
status*partner’s education, wealth, land) and, possibly, more volatile incomes (rural) (Tables 5
to 7).
We also investigated heterogeneity of the employment-income relationship with respect to
the index woman’s education and cohort. Her education and cohort are natural predictors
6Women who were married but are currently without a partner are more likely to be primary workers who
are employed even in good times.
7We also estimated the model for never-married women with no children for Africa and Latin America; there
was too small and unrepresentative a sample of never-married women for Asia. Never-married women in Latin
America exhibit counter-cyclical employment but to a lesser degree than their married counterparts, consistent
with our results on current marital status and fertility. Never-married women in Africa exhibit counter-cyclical
employment in contrast to their married counterparts
12of her employment level. Her education is likely to inﬂuence her response to income shocks
because less educated women tend to suﬀer smaller losses from labour market absence or to
engage more readily in transient work (e.g. Attanasio et al.; 2005). Her cohort is likely to
modify the income gradient if cohort is correlated with fertility or attitudes towards labour
market attachment. The education gradient was presented in Table 3 where we observed that
counter-cyclical behaviour is stronger amongst less educated women. We now show that this
pattern holds within age-cohort, using the age groups 20-24 (sample mean of .22), 25-35 (.43)
and 36-49 (.35) (Table 8)8. Responsiveness to income shocks is increasing in age-cohort. This
appears to contradict results of fertility interactions since the probability of living with a child
under 5 is decreasing in age (81.4% of 20-24 year olds, 73.7% of 25-35 year olds and 43.8% of
older women have at least one child under the age of 5). However income eﬀects speciﬁc to
cohort and fertility reconcile this- women with young children show stronger countercyclical
responses in every age group and the strength of the response is increasing in age (Table 8).
Overall, the results in this section lend considerable support to the hypothesis that women’s
transient employment is motivated by insurance needs. They show that women who enter the
labour market in downturns are a more diverse group including poorer women, women with
young children, older women and married women who, in better times, are less likely to work.
As discussed in Section 1, this motivates concern about the implications of this sort of transitory
labour supply.
4.3 Employment Transitions
It has been argued that the discouraged worker eﬀect overwhelms the added worker eﬀect in
aggregate data (Cain; 1966). If the unemployment of men is rising or their wages are falling on
account of a general downturn then the shadow wage of their wives will be falling as well, making
it less likely that women seek and are able to ﬁnd employment. We expect that this argument is
less relevant in developing countries to the extent that binding subsistence constraints override
marginal substitution eﬀects and there is an expansive informal sector to which entry and
exit barriers are low. To illuminate this, we estimate a multinomial logit model in which the
dependent variable is lnPi/(1 − Pi) where Pi is the probability of being self employed (.25) or
not employed (.56) relative to being in paid employment (sample mean of 0.19). Deﬁnitions of
these categories of work are discussed in the data appendix. The sample and the speciﬁcation of
the independent variables is as for the baseline equation (1). See Table 9. On average across the
entire set of developing countries, recessions are associated with an increase in self-employment
8A similar ﬁnding emerges in scattered case studies, for example, analysing the stabilization period in Costa
Rica when aggregate income fell, Gindling (1993) ﬁnds that additional work participation was largely of less
educated women.
13and a decline in non-employment relative to paid employment9 This suggests that the overall
increase in employment in recessions comes from women who were previously not participating
taking employment and that this is predominantly self employment. The move towards self-
employment is of similar magnitude for women of diﬀerent educational levels and apparent
in every developing country region. The relative increase in non-employment is bell-shaped in
women’s education. It is plausible that, amongst uneducated women this reﬂects unemployment
while, amongst women with higher education, it reﬂects non-participation. The individual LPM
estimates suggest that recessions produce a rise in self-employment amongst women in each of
the regions but these additional workers come exclusively from non-employment in Asia and
Latin America whereas, in Africa, the increase in self-employment is entirely fed by a decline in
paid employment. The responses ﬂowing from a 10% decline in GDP are, in probability units,
as follows. In Asia, non-employment declines by 0.17 and this is distributed as 0.10 in paid
and 0.07 in self-employment. In Latin-America, non-employment declines by 1.22, which is
distributed as 0.385 in paid and 0.835 in self-employment. In Africa, paid employment declines
by 0.39 and this is distributed as 0.24 in self-employment and 0.15 in non-employment
4.4 Speciﬁcation Checks
4.4.1 Correlated Shocks
It is unlikely that there is any substantial feedback from changes in women’s labour force
participation to changes in income and, if there were, this would be positive and we would under-
estimate counter-cyclicality. However shocks at the country-year level that inﬂuence both Y and
L may bias β and they may not be adequately captured by the combination of country dummies
and trends in the model10. To investigate this, we instrumented Y (GDP) with rainfall shocks
(as in Miguel et al. (2004); Ciccone and Fargas (2008) who use data for Africa) and terms of
trade (as in Pritchett and Summers (1996) who use data from across developing countries). The
instruments are powerful but the test of over-identifying restrictions fails (p=0.0)11 Pritchett
and Summers (1996) and Miguel et al. (2004) use these instruments one at a time and so
are unable to directly test for their validity. The ﬁndings direct attention to the importance
of distinguishing external from exogenous variables in the selection of instruments (Heckman;
9We also obtained linear probability estimates for the speciﬁcation of the baseline model with the dependent
variable now deﬁned for a speciﬁc employment category rather than for any employment. This gives absolute
rather than relative eﬀects. A 10% drop in GDP is associated with increase in the probability of self-employment
of 0.032 and a decline in the probability of non-employment of 0.04, with the probability of paid employment
actually increasing by 0.008. Each of these changes is statistically signiﬁcant.
10For example civil conﬂict is associated with lower income (Miguel et al.; 2004) and, as was the case after
World War II (Acemoglu et al.; 2004), may have inﬂuenced women’s participation.
11Our ﬁnding that both rain and terms of trade shocks inﬂuence women’s employment conditional upon
income shocks is unsurprising given that these shocks are likely to alter the structure of production (income
constant) and women’s work is often sector-speciﬁc.
142000; Deaton; 2008). Rainfall shocks are popular as instruments because they are clearly
external to women’s employment, being generated by nature and, similarly, terms of trade are
determined outside the country, but this does not guarantee that the inﬂuence of these variables
on women’s work operates exclusively through income. Other studies have instrumented GDP
with settler mortality (Acemoglu et al.; 2001), ethno-linguistic fractionalisation (Easterly and
Levine; 1997) and identity of coloniser (Shleifer and Vishny; 1998). Their exogeneity is an article
of faith but, in any case, as these instruments are time-invariant, they are not useful here where
the identifying variation is over time. We abjure the use of IV and, instead, explore sensitivity
of our estimates to including as regressors a set of observable country-year variables, including
rainfall shocks, terms of trade, civil conﬂict, inﬂation and ﬁnancial development (column 6,
Table 10). The income coeﬃcient is smaller (-0.028) and signiﬁcant at the 10% level (t-statistic
of 1.9). The drop in the coeﬃcient is consistent with GDP being correlated, as we know it is,
with the added macro-variables. It can be argued that the baseline model which suppresses
these additional macro-variables denotes the “full” eﬀect of GDP shocks.
4.4.2 Sub-Region and Region Fixed Eﬀects
A recognised problem in the growth literature is that any reduction in bias gained by discarding
between-country variation tends to exacerbate measurement error and typically comes at the
expense of lower eﬃciency. For these reasons, Barro (1997), Temple (1999), Pritchett (2000)
and Wacziarg (2002) all argue that country ﬁxed eﬀects in cross-country models need to be
used with caution; see Durlauf et al. (2005, section 6.2). These concerns are pertinent in the
current context and they suggest that we may be under-estimating the GDP coeﬃcient. An
increase in the noise to signal ratio generated by taking diﬀerences or deviations from means
is greater the more persistent the variable and income (GDP) is a highly persistent variable
(Griliches and Hausman; 1986). Moreover, GDP in developing countries is often measured with
error. For example, the Penn World Tables (PWT), from which GDP data are routinely drawn
for research, reckons that data for all 43 sub-Saharan African countries have margins of error
of 30-40%. Johnson et al. (2009) show that successive versions of the PWT produce radically
diﬀerent rankings of African countries by rates of growth between the same years12
As a robustness check we estimate a model that includes not only within-country variation as
before but also the between-country variation within sub-regions. We created nine sub-regions
within the three developing country regions (the Middle East and ex-USSR groups are small
and left as they are)13. Amongst developing countries, weighting by the number of countries
per sub-region, the average sub-region includes 21 survey years; precise years per sub-region
12If the measurement error is ﬁxed at the country level then the country ﬁxed eﬀects model is at an advantage.
However this may be too restrictive a characterisation of measurement error.
13For this we used on-line maps and common knowledge.
15are in Table 1. We re-estimated equation (1) replacing country (c) ﬁxed eﬀects with sub-region
(r) ﬁxed eﬀects and obtained estimates of equation 4 for the full sample and each region. As
the time series within country is now much longer, these equations include a quadratic in the
sub-region or region-speciﬁc trends and year ﬁxed eﬀects14.
Licrt = ¨ α + ¨ βYcrt + Xicrt ¨ γ + Zcgt ¨ θ + ¨ ηr + ¨ λt + ¨ δ1r t + ¨ δ2r t
2 + ¨ εicrt, (4)
This sort of strategy is not uncommon15 Omitted variables that stand to bias the esti-
mated relationship between women’s employment and income include labour market or family
institutions, for example, the extent of state-provided unemployment insurance or conventions
regarding income pooling. There is no reason to believe that the country is the natural level at
which these institutions vary, for example, family norms may vary across ethnic groups that cut
across countries. Regions represent a stable division of people with a fairly distinct history and
culture. In contrast, the borders of countries within these regions are, in many cases, arbitrary,
with ethnicity, language and culture crossing country borders. A vast literature questions the
construction of nation states under colonial rulers16.
Results are in Table 11. Using the sample on which equation (1) was estimated (n=1m,
N=43, T≥2) but replacing country with sub-region ﬁxed eﬀects, we ﬁnd a similar pattern of
results by region, indicating pro-cyclicality in Africa and counter-cyclicality in Asia and Latin
America17. The results are qualitative similar when we use the larger sample that incorporates
the 20 countries for which only one survey round is available (7.4% of the potential sample of
14The income coeﬃcient is stronger if instead we use region-year ﬁxed eﬀects.
15For example, Besley and Kudamatsu (2006) use region (∼continent) rather than country ﬁxed eﬀects in their
baseline model and Acemoglu et al. (2001), amongst others, include no controls for unobserved heterogeneity
in their baseline speciﬁcation, exploring region ﬁxed eﬀects in a variant. In the micro-panel literature, there are
thousands of individual ﬁrms or households that, unlike countries, have no particular identity of interest and
the accepted strategy is to purge ﬁrm eﬀects. In the growth literature, on the other hand, including country
ﬁxed eﬀects often absorbs a lot of the variation of interest, especially when the variation is limited whether
because the variable is naturally sluggish or because T is small. The latter is the case in our baseline model.
16This literature cuts across history, political science and anthropology. Amongst them the following studies
more than make the point. All of the chapters in Cohen (1995) are relevant but see, for example, Aderanti
Adepoju’s contribution to Section 6. Baud and van Schendel (1997) and Parker (2006) provides an accessible
overview. The Centre for International Borders Research at http://www.qub.ac.uk/cibr/ provides links to
a wealth of material for each sub-region, for example, http://www.qub.ac.uk/cibr/BordersBiblioAfrica.htm.
Howard French (undated) provides useful detail for Africa and Kaufman (1976) for Latin America and East
Europe, although relevant reference to boundary setting in Africa and Asia is also made. Multiple authors
document sub-region speciﬁc cases in a book series, Arbitrary Borders: Political Boundaries In World History
Set, 17-Volumes referenced as published by Chelsea House.
17The only notable qualitative diﬀerence in the results is that employment amongst women with secondary
or higher education in Latin America is no longer countercyclical. Note that the total eﬀect, obtained on the
sample that pools the three developing country regions is misleading because it is an average over a larger
positive coeﬃcient for Africa, a weaker negative coeﬃcient for Latin America and a larger negative coeﬃcient
for Asia. These changes in coeﬃcients indicate the sign of the between-country within-sub-region relationship
between L and Y
16women); n=1.07m, N=63, T≥1 (panel B of the table).
We took this a step further, estimating an equation with ﬁxed eﬀects for the three regions
rather than the nine sub-regions. Within sub-Saharan Africa, we have 75 survey years (obser-
vations) for 30 countries, within Asia, 23 years for 10 countries and within Latin America, 32
years for 12 countries (see Table 1).
Licgt = ˜ α + ˜ βYcgt + Xicgt ˜ γ + Zcgt ˜ θ + ˜ ηg + ˜ λt + ˜ δ1g t + ˜ δ2g t
2 + ˜ εicgt, (5)
Results are in Table A5. The estimates are close in magnitude and sign to the estimates
from the model with country ﬁxed eﬀects, with the diﬀerence that Africa now appears to have
counter-cyclical female employment just like the other two regions. This suggests that while
the within-country and within-sub-region variation in L and Y produce a positive relationship
in Africa, their between-country (and between-sub-region) variation is negatively related- this
is clear in Figure 2. This of course does not challenge the baseline within-country estimates,
it merely shows that using the between-variation preserves the baseline results if it remains
within sub-region but that the between-country variation across sub-regions is of the opposite
sign in the case of Africa. To the extent that the between-country ﬁndings indicate a long run
relationship, this is of independent interest.
4.4.3 Other Speciﬁcation Checks
This section investigates extensions that include adjustment of GDP for month of interview,
allowance of dynamics, generalisation of functional form, the use of country-averaged panel data
and asymmetry in the income eﬀect. The baseline model for these checks is that in equation (1).
Results are in Table 10. Columns 1-2 show that the pooled conditional correlation is -0.18,
falling to -0.067 when country ﬁxed eﬀects and trends are included. This suggests that, in
the developing country sample as a whole, the between-country relationship is negative (as in
Figure 1). As explained earlier, we use GDP adjusted for the month of interview of the index
woman. Since this is of potential relevance to other studies that use information gathered at a
point in time on a variable that exhibits seasonal variation, we investigate how much diﬀerence
this makes. On this sample, we ﬁnd it makes no diﬀerence (column 3). If families do not
anticipate aggregate income variation or there are job search lags, women’s employment may
respond with a lag. Including lagged GDP in the model together with its current value, we
ﬁnd that the action is in the ﬁrst lag and that the long run eﬀect (the sum of the coeﬃcients
on current and lagged income) is the same as in the baseline model (column 4). If we retain
only lagged income in the model (not shown), its coeﬃcient and standard error are almost
17identical to those on current income. We therefore proceed with the baseline model18. We
next included a quadratic in Y , so as to allow for example that larger income shocks are more
likely to stimulate distress work. The quadratic is signiﬁcant but the turning point is at the
4th centile of the income distribution, so the relationship is predominantly negative (column
8) and the baseline speciﬁcation therefore seems reasonable.
The standard errors reported so far are robust but they are not fully adjusted for non-
independence within countries. Our reasoning was that country ﬁxed eﬀects absorb relevant
unobservables that are common across women and that autocorrelation in the errors is made
less likely by the fact that the time intervals are wide. Recall that the number of observations
within a cluster (n∼1 million) is very large, the number of clusters is ﬁxed (N- typically 43,
goes up to 63) and T is small. So, rather than adjust the standard errors for clustering at the
country level, we estimated the baseline model on a country panel obtained by averaging across
women in a country for each year to get an employment rate. The standard errors are now
much larger and the income coeﬃcient is insigniﬁcant but the point estimate is twice as large
as in the baseline case (it is -0.152 with a s.e. of 0.22). One interpretation of this is that we do
not have suﬃcient independent variation to identify the income coeﬃcient precisely. Another is
that the model estimated on country-averaged data is not correctly speciﬁed (e.g. Gelman and
Hill; 2007), in particular, the insurance hypothesis naturally involves heterogeneous behaviour
within country which we have modelled by allowing the income coeﬃcient to vary with the
index woman’s education and indicators of her risk of being liquidity constrained.
The hypothesis is that women enter the labour market in recessions and exit in booms. It
seems plausible that they may enter because consumption constraints compel income-generating
activities but then persist in the activity when conditions improve (Spletzer; 1997). We therefore
investigate asymmetry in the main eﬀect as follows. We create an indicator for recessions which
is deﬁned as unity for years in which GDP has grown relative to the preceding year and include
an interaction term between the recession indicator and income in the baseline model19. This
is negative and signiﬁcant although small, indicating that recessions stimulate more entry than
booms stimulate exit (Table 12). Note that these results rest on 12% of annual changes in GDP
in the data being negative, the other 88% were positive. Note also that these estimates, which
involve annual income changes, do not directly correspond to the baseline estimates where
recessions are indicated by deviations of income (often spaced four or ﬁve years apart) from
trend.
18Recall that the DHS sample contains irregular intervals between years. However we have annual GDP data
and so we use the genuine ﬁrst lag. A simple regression of income (GDP) on its ﬁrst lag yields a coeﬃcient of
1 and has an R2 of 0.996.
19Although we have employment data only for the irregular DHS years, we use the publicly available annual
time series of GDP to construct the ﬁrst lag. The dummy recession = 1 (dlogGDP < 0).
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5.1 Africa
The benchmark model for analysis of married women’s labour supply assumes income pooling
(e.g. Lundberg; 1985). Empirical evidence has called this into question and a number of the
violations documented are in Africa (Schultz; 1999; Udry; 1996; Jones; 1986). To the extent that
African women do not rely ﬁnancially upon men, they will tend to behave as primary workers.
As we have shown, pro-cyclical employment signiﬁes the loss of paid jobs in recessions, only
some of which is compensated by a rise in self-employment. Aggregate income shocks in Africa,
more than in Asia and Latin America, are often driven by unexpectedly adverse rain conditions
and the main sector in which women work is agriculture. So a possible explanation of our
ﬁndings is that African women are disadvantaged by the fact that the sector that experiences
the negative shock is the sector in which they naturally seek employment. The alternative of
informal paid employment appears to be more restricted in Africa than in the other two regions.
For each region, we ran a regression of log GDP on rainfall shocks, country and year dummies,
country-speciﬁc trends and demographic controls. The coeﬃcient on rain shocks was 0.20 in
Africa, 0.013 in Asia and -0.023 in Latin America, signiﬁcant at the 1% level in each case.
5.2 Relation to Previous Findings
The sensitivity of women’s work to recessions has been highlighted in a historical literature;
see the collection of papers in Rubery (1988). This literature invokes competing hypotheses
concerning the dynamics of women’s work. The buﬀer hypothesis predicts that women are dis-
proportionately laid oﬀ in recessions and recruited in booms, while the substitution hypothesis
predicts that women are substituted for men in recessions as employers pursue cost-saving and
households seek to maintain living standards (Humphries; 1988). Recessions were associated
with direct substitution of women for men in the US (Humphries; 1988) and indirect substi-
tution of unstable jobs (for women) for stable jobs (for men) in Britain (Rubery and Tarling;
1988). Some evidence, of employers encouraging married women with children to leave formal
sector employment during the Korean economic crisis, and of a corresponding rise in informal
employment in this group is cited in Kim and Voos (2007).
The few available cross-sectional estimates for developing countries conform with the hy-
pothesis that labour supply curves may be forward falling (negative at low wages) rather than
positively sloped or backward bending (negative at high wages) when liquidity constraints are
important. For example, Hern´ andez-Licona (1996) and Bhalotra (2007) ﬁnd negative own-
wage elasticities amongst women in urban Mexico and rural India respectively. Analysing an
alternative dataset from rural India, Rosenzweig (1980) ﬁnds that less market work is supplied
19by women in wealthier households located in agricultural development districts and in areas
experiencing good weather. There is little systematic evidence on the cyclicality of women’s
labour supply in poorer countries. Recent exceptions include Hern´ andez and Romano (2009)
and Bhalotra (2009) who show that women’s labour supply is counter-cyclical in urban Mexico
and rural India respectively and that, in both cases, this is most evident in informal sector
work. Further country-speciﬁc evidence consistent with our hypotheses emerges from analyses
of crisis episodes. The Introduction referred to Thomas et al. (2003) who present a particu-
larly insightful analysis showing that, during the Indonesian economic crisis of 1997/8, wages
fell by 40%, employment amongst men declined by 1.5% and employment amongst women
increased by 0.8% (in a year). Contrary to expectation (e.g. World Bank; 1998), aggregate
employment was remarkably stable but this masked considerable turnover, especially amongst
women. Large numbers of women entered and left the labour market but entry was about
twice the exit rate. The added workers were mostly self-employed and are estimated to have
made a substantial contribution to maintaining income. Tanzania’s recession in the mid-1980s
was similarly associated with an expansion of informal sector work amongst women (Tripp;
1992). However, evidence for the peso crisis in (urban) Mexico is mixed. McKenzie (2003)
argues that it had no impact on the labour force participation of men or women, but Parker
and Skouﬁas (2004) demonstrate signiﬁcant increases in women’s participation. This study
has contributed by studying the dynamics of employment with microdata that permit analysis
of heterogeneous responses by individual characteristics, while also allowing cross-country and
cross-region comparisons.
Simulations of a multi-sector model calibrated for Mexico suggest that the size of the in-
formal sector moves inversely to productivity (in either sector); see Satchi and Temple (2009).
Consistent with this, analyses of survey data from (urban) Mexico show that informal sector
employment is counter-cyclical (Bosch and Maloney; 2007) and that it is decreasing in family
income (Gong et al.; 2004). This paper diﬀers from these studies in focusing upon women.
Previous work has highlighted the paucity of rigorous analysis of the role of women’s work
in structural adjustment processes in developing countries (Horton et al.; 1994) and the more
general tendency to neglect labour market structure and behaviour in studies of aggregate
development (Ag´ enor; 1996, 2004, 2005; Fields; 1984; Freeman; 1992). There is a somewhat
related US literature concerned with the role of job reallocation in adjustment to aggregate
shocks and the dynamics of big vs. small ﬁrm employment (Davis and Haltiwanger; 1992).
6 Conclusions
The between-country relationship between women’s employment and aggregate income is neg-
ative in Africa, ﬂatter but still negative in Asia and positive in the other regions. The within-
20subregion and the within-country relationships are, on average, negative in Asia and Latin
America but positive in Africa. These conditional correlations are robust to controls for country-
speciﬁc trends and potentially correlated shocks including, for instance, rainfall, inﬂation and
war. We ﬁnd evidence of asymmetry with employment responses to declining income being
stronger than to rising income, although the diﬀerence is not large. We suggest that amongst
reasons why African women behave diﬀerently are that the conventional family structure with
income pooling is less the norm, they show a greater baseline participation in agriculture, and
aggregate income shocks are more strongly correlated with rainfall shocks. Country-speciﬁc es-
timates for selected countries indicate greater heterogeneity in income responses within Africa
than within the other regions. The counter-cyclical tendency in women’s employment be-
haviour is stronger in households that face a greater risk of consumption inadequacy in the
wake of income shocks. This is indicated by the woman’s marital status, the education of her
husband (if married), household wealth, land ownership, rural location and the presence of
young children. These ﬁndings buttress the hypothesis that insurance motives underpin the
dynamics of women’s work participation. We also allow heterogeneity in the income coeﬃcient
by education and cohort of the woman. Less educated (and older) women are most likely to
exhibit transient employment in downturns, consistent with their incurring lower skill depre-
ciation during absences. Examination of cyclicality in the distribution of employment across
types suggests that recessions are associated with women in Asia and Latin America shifting
from non-employment to both paid and self-employment while, in Africa, paid employment
falls and women are thrown into both self-employment and non-employment. The rise in non-
employment amongst women in Africa indicates that they are constrained in their ability to
insure their households.
Although we extensively model heterogeneity, our main contribution is probably to oﬀer
stylized facts based upon a broad brushed picture for a large sample of developing countries.
Future work might conduct more experimental studies of speciﬁc cases and analyse more care-
fully the role of institutions. A ﬁne extension of the analysis would be to model fertility timing
jointly with the timing of women’s employment. Further research is also needed on the impact
of exogenous changes in the employment of mothers on current or later life outcomes of young
children.
The results contribute to a growing literature on the consequences of income volatility in de-
veloping countries. Transitory labour supply on the part of women may have important largely
undocumented consequences for the timing of fertility and of human capital investments in
children. It is also an important component of macroeconomic adjustment. Women’s employ-
ment has been argued to increase their autonomy and bargaining power (e.g. Lundberg et al.;
1997; Haddad and Hoddinott; 1994) but these beneﬁts are unlikely to ﬂow from transitory em-
ployment driven by distress. We found that although the direct eﬀect of fertility (the presence
21of a child under the age of ﬁve) on mother’s employment is negative, the interaction eﬀect is
positive. The widespread entry of women into the labour market in response to a decline in
demand may have wider adverse eﬀects, contributing to keeping wages low, slowing the process
of recovery and, at the aggregate level, creating conditions for a poverty trap.20 This adds
to equity considerations an eﬃciency-based motive for introducing unemployment beneﬁts or
other forms of income insurance for families that suﬀer temporary shocks to income driven by
forces that are largely outside their control.
20The key to this is that labour supply decisions are taken at the level of the household. In this case, aggregate
demand and unemployment will inﬂuence the supply curve of labour, creating potential multiple equilibria (e.g.
Basu et al.; 1999). However, if the added workers are, as we ﬁnd, primarily self-employed, the extent to which
this happens will depend upon the linkages between the wage and non-wage sectors.
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FLFP = −0.0890 ln(GDP) + u
     s.e    [0.0224]
MLFP = −0.0272 ln(GDP) + u
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Source: WDI. For every country, we average the income and labour force participation across all
years 1986-2006 so that each point is a country.
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Source: WDI. For every country, we average the income and labour force participation across all
years 1986-2006 so that each point is a country.













































12 13 14 15 16
mean − adjusted ln(GDP percapita [USD 2000])
Source: DHS. Employment and income are averages for each coun-
try at irregular intervals (each DHS year).
33Tables
Table 1: Countries by region, sub-region, observations, rounds and years of interview.
Country and acronym total % obs Number Years of interview
(Sub-) Region obs. of surveys
SubSaharan Africa
West Africa 30
Benin BJ 29504 1.7 3 1996, 2001, 2006
Burkina Faso BF 25276 1.4 3 1992/93, 1998/99, 2003
Cote d’Ivoire CI 11139 0.6 2 1994, 1998/99
Ghana GH 19584 1.1 4 1988, 1993, 1998, 2003
Guinea GN 14707 0.8 2 1999, 2005
Mali ML 40336 2.3 4 1987, 1995/96, 2001, 2006
Niger NI 23303 1.3 3 1992, 1998, 2006
Nigeria NG 26211 1.5 3 1990, 1999, 2003
Senegal SN 33920 1.9 4 1986, 1992/93, 1997, 2005
Togo TG 11929 0.7 2 1988, 1998
Central Africa 8
CAR CF 5884 0.3 1 1994/95
Cameroon CM 20028 1.1 3 1991, 1998, 2004
Chad TD 13539 0.8 2 1996/97, 2004
Congo CG 7051 0.4 1 2005
Gabon GA 6183 0.3 1 2000
East Africa 33
Burundi BU 3970 0.2 1 1987
Comoros KM 3050 0.2 1 1996
Ethiopia ET 29437 1.7 2 2000, 2005
Kenya KE 30766 1.7 4 1989, 1993, 1998, 2003
Madagascar MD 21269 1.2 3 1992, 1997, 2003/2004
Malawi MW 29767 1.7 3 1992, 2000, 2004
Mozambique MZ 21197 1.2 2 1997, 2003
Rwanda RW 28293 1.6 3 1992, 2000, 2005
Tanzania TZ 27687 1.6 3 1992, 1996, 2004
Uganda UG 27577 1.6 4 1988, 1995, 2000/01, 2006
Zambia ZM 22739 1.3 3 1992, 1996, 2001/02
Zimbabwe ZW 25143 1.4 4 1988, 1994, 1999, 2005/2006
South Africa 4
Lesotho LS 7095 0.4 1 2004
Namibia NM 12176 0.7 2 1992, 2000
South Africa ZA 11735 0.7 1 1998
sub-total 31 590495 75
Asia
South Asia 12
Bangladesh BD 40751 2.3 4 1993/94, 1996/97, 1999/2000, 2004
India IA 304465 17.1 3 1992/93, 1998/99, 2005/06
Nepal NP 27948 1.6 3 1996, 2001, 2006
Pakistan PK 6611 0.4 1 1990/91
Sri Lanka LK 5865 0.3 1 1987
Continued on next page
34Table 1: Countries by region, sub-region, observations, rounds and years of interview.
Country and acronym total % obs Number Years of interview
(Sub-) Region obs. of surveys
Asia Paciﬁc 9
Indonesia ID 121254 6.8 5 1987, 1991, 1994, 1997, 2002/2003
Philippines PH 42645 2.4 3 1993, 1998, 2003
Thailand TH 6775 0.4 1 1987
Indochina 4
Cambodia KH 32174 1.8 2 2000, 2005
Vietnam VNT 11329 0.6 2 1997, 2002
sub-total 10 599817 25
Latin America
Central America and Caribbean 13
Dominican Republic DR 46769 2.6 4 1986, 1991, 1996, 2002
Guatemala GU 17563 1.0 2 1987, 1995
Haiti HT 26272 1.5 3 1994/95, 2000, 2005
Honduras HN 19948 1.1 1 2005
Nicaragua NC 26694 1.5 2 1997/98, 2001
Trinidad and Tobago TT 3806 0.2 1 1987
South America 19
Bolivia BO 45367 2.6 4 1989, 1994, 1998, 2003
Brazil BR 24727 1.4 3 1986, 1991, 1996
Colombia CO 78040 4.4 5 1986, 1990, 1995, 2000, 2005
Ecuador EC 4713 0.3 1 1987
Paraguay PY 5827 0.3 1 1990
Peru PE 90140 5.1 5 1986, 1992, 1996, 2000, 2004/2005
sub-total 14 389866 32
Middle East
Egypt EG 68601 3.9 5 1988, 1992, 1995, 2000, 2005
Morocco MA 32036 1.8 3 1987, 1992, 2003/2004
Sudan SD 5860 0.3 1 1990
Tunisia TN 4184 0.2 1 1988
Turkey TR 23170 1.3 3 1993, 1998, 2003
Yemen YE 6010 0.3 1 1991/92
sub-total 6 139861 14
Ex USSR
Armenia AM 12996 0.7 2 2000, 2005
Kazakhstan KK 8571 0.5 2 1995, 1999
Kyrgyz Republic KY 3848 0.2 1 1997
Moldova MB 7440 0.4 1 2005
Uzbekistan UZ 4415 0.2 1 1996
sub-total 5 37270 7
Total 63 countries 1757309 100 153
Note: 20 countries had 1 survey, 13 had 2, 17 had 3, 9 had 4 and 4 had 5. Of the 153 surveys, 126
interview a representative sample of all women 15 to 49 years old. These include all countries in Africa,
Latin America and ex-USSR. In the other 27 surveys, which pertain to 15 countries in Asia and the
Middle East, the sample was restricted to ever-married women. This diﬀerence is probably a response
to never-married women being scarce in Asia and the Middle East. In Asia, 4 of 10 countries and 7 of
25 surveys have data on all women and, in the Middle East, this is 2 of 6 countries and 3 of 14 surveys.
The slanted and underlined years in the table indicate the surveys which collected data for all women in
Asia and the Middle East. We do not have every country in the Region in our sample.
35Table 2: Employment status and individual characteristics of women1/.
All Employment status
women not working working
Total 100 50.9 49.1
Cohort
20-24 18.3 60.9 39.1
25-35 44.3 51.0 49.0
36 + 37.4 45.9 54.1
Education
None 39.7 49.7 50.3
Some 47.1 52.3 47.7
Complete 13.2 49.3 50.7
Partners’ Education
None 28.3 48.4 51.6
Some 51.0 50.1 49.9
Complete 20.7 56.2 43.8
Wealth quartiles
1 33.1 50.2 49.8
2 23.9 49.2 50.8
3 22.6 50.8 49.2
4 20.3 54.0 46.1
Area
Urban 37.5 54.1 45.9
Rural 62.5 48.9 51.1
Marital Status (current)
Not married2/ 9.8 34.9 65.1
Married 90.3 52.6 47.4
Children under 5 in hh
No 36.1 48.3 51.7
Yes 63.9 52.3 47.7
log(GDP p.c.) quintile
1 18.1 34.1 65.9
2 34.7 52.5 47.6
3 9.6 50.7 49.3
4 21.9 62.1 37.9
5 15.7 51.1 48.9
Asymmetry
booms (dlgdp3/ > 0) 87.4 51.5 48.5
recessions (dlgdp3/ < 0) 12.6 46.5 53.5
Continent
SubS. Africa 31.5 35.6 64.4
Asia 36.8 56.7 43.3
Latin Am. 19.6 49.6 50.4
Middle East 9.8 80.2 19.8
Ex USSR 2.2 51.9 48.1
1/ Evermarried women older than 20 years.
2/ Evermarried women might not be married at the time of the
survey.
Levels of education: none - if 0 years of education, some - less than
complete secondary and higher - complete secondary or more.
3/ dlgdp = ln(gdp)t − ln(gdp)t−1
36Table 3: Income eﬀects on women’s employment by women’s education and region. Country
ﬁxed eﬀects.
Total Women’s level of education
N eﬀect1/ none some higher
(1) (2) (3) (4)
(A) 43 Countries (T≥2)
Total 2/
lgdp 1,000,983 -0.074* -0.078* -0.091* -0.003
s.e. [0.009] [0.009] [0.009] [0.009]
By region
SubSAfrica 352,893 0.070* 0.064* 0.075* 0.099*
Asia 428,424 -0.130* -0.116* -0.159* -0.085*
Latin America 219,666 -0.158* -0.163* -0.165* -0.137*
Middle East 104,783 -0.265* -0.223* -0.260* -0.384*
Ex USSR 15,009 -0.217 -0.929 -0.246 -0.178
(B) 13 Countries (T≥4)
Total 2/
lgdp 366,868 -0.169* -0.173* -0.181* -0.124*
s.e. [0.018] [0.018] [0.018] [0.019]
By region
SubSAfrica 110,422 -0.466* -0.500* -0.445* -0.245*
Asia 95,100 -2.404* -2.370* -2.401* -2.506*
Latin America 161,346 -0.249* -0.219* -0.261* -0.232*
Middle East 65,240 -1.411* -1.274* -1.337* -1.749*
Ex USSR 0
Robust standard errors (s.e.) in brackets. * signiﬁcant at 5%
The dependent variable is a dummy for women’s employment (mean=0.49).
The estimator is OLS. The model includes country ﬁxed eﬀects and trends, the
woman’s age cohort, her level of education, her current marital status, whether
she is household head, her partner’s level of education, number of children
under ﬁve in household, rural/urban location, number of adult members in
household, wealth quartile of her household, the share of women of working age
in the population, the inverse of the urbanisation rate and seasonal controls;
see equation (1) in text. ln(GDP) is interacted with the level of education of
the index woman.
1/ Total eﬀects are calculated by diﬀerentiating equation (3) with respect to
income as follows: (i) All women:
∂Licgt
∂ lnYcgt = β + φ1 ∗ mean(someeducicgt) +
φ2 ∗ mean(compleducicgt); (ii) Illiterate women:
∂Licgt
∂ lnYcgt = β; (iii) Less than
complete secondary:
∂Licgt
∂ lnYcgt = β + φ1; and (iv) Highly educated women:
∂Licgt
∂ lnYcgt = β + φ2.
2/ Total average income eﬀects include Africa, Asia and Latin America
only.
37Table 4: Income eﬀects on women’s employment by country.
Sub-Saharan Africa
Ghana Kenya Mali Senegal Uganda Zimbabwe
log(gdp) 10.609 -7.871 0.140 -11.692 0.573 0.449
[1.598]* [0.296]* [0.205] [2.344]* [0.335] [0.086]*
elasticity 13.230 -15.687 0.236 -24.425 0.856 0.914
mean(working) 0.802 0.502 0.592 0.479 0.669 0.492
Observations 12,393 19,685 29,843 15,306 18,390 14,805
R-squared 0.13 0.22 0.06 0.06 0.33 0.07
Asia Middle East
Bangladesh Indonesia Egypt
log(gdp) -7.809 -8.654 -1.563
[0.466]* [1.036]* [0.211]*
elasticity -29.843 -17.906 -8.055
mean(working) 0.262 0.483 0.194
Observations 34,075 61,025 65,240
R-squared 0.08 0.07 0.17
Latin America
Bolivia Dominican Rep Colombia Peru
log(gdp) -1.963 0.615 -1.251 -0.184
[0.200]* [0.697] [0.350]* [0.049]*
elasticity -3.457 1.457 -2.440 -0.308
mean(working) 0.568 0.422 0.513 0.597
Observations 28,681 28,620 46,665 57,380
R-squared 0.13 0.12 0.14 0.07
Robust standard errors (s.e.) in brackets. * signiﬁcant at 5%. See
notes to Table 3. These are estimates from country-speciﬁc time
series, equation (2), for the 13 countries with T≥4.
38Table 5: Income eﬀects by marital status and partners’ education.
Marital status Partner’s level of education
N Total Not Currently Total none some higher
eﬀect married married eﬀect
Total 1,000,983
mean 100 9.7 90.3 100 28.9 50.5 20.6
lgdp -0.066* -0.018 -0.071* -0.079* -0.091* -0.094* -0.029*
s.e. [0.009] [0.009] [0.009] [0.009] [0.009] [0.009] [0.009]
By region
% women in each category % women in each category
SubSAfrica 31.8 100 10.7 89.4 100 44.8 47.4 7.9
Asia 38.2 100 6.5 93.5 100 25.6 48.8 25.6
Latin America 19.3 100 15.3 84.7 100 10.1 62.2 27.8
Middle East 9.4 100 7.1 92.9 100 30.8 43.7 25.5
Ex USSR 1.3 100 11.5 88.5 100 0.3 54.5 45.2
ln(gdp) coeﬃcient ln(gdp) coeﬃcient
SubSAfrica 352,893 0.072* 0.061* 0.073* 0.067* 0.055* 0.078* 0.074*
Asia 428,424 -0.130* -0.069* -0.134* -0.130* -0.118* -0.155* -0.094*
Latin America 219,666 -0.154* -0.131* -0.158* -0.158* -0.164* -0.163* -0.145*
Middle East 104,783 -0.257* -0.258* -0.257* -0.260* -0.190* -0.253* -0.358*
Ex USSR 15,009 -0.214 -0.052 -0.236 -0.230 -0.036 -0.249 -0.207
Robust standard errors (s.e.) in brackets. * signiﬁcant at 5%. See notes to Table 3. The speciﬁcation
estimated corresponds to equation (3). ln(GDP) is interacted with either the marital status of the
index woman or her partner’s level of education.
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9Table 6: Income eﬀects by household wealth quartiles and agricultural land ownership.
Household wealth quartiles Owns agricultural land
N Total ﬁrst second third fourth N Total No Yes
eﬀect eﬀect
Total 1,000,983 918,020
mean 100 33.1 24.2 22.6 20.2 100 70.3 29.7
lgdp -0.068* -0.093* -0.083* -0.053* -0.028* -0.043* -0.034* -0.069*
s.e. [0.009] [0.009] [0.009] [0.009] [0.009] [0.010] [0.010] [0.010]
By region
mean of hh wealth (index) % women in each category
SubSAfrica 31.8 100 38.4 21.3 21.0 19.4 33.7 100 56.4 43.6
Asia 38.2 100 30.3 22.3 24.0 23.4 34.9 100 73.5 26.5
Latin America 19.3 100 31.4 30.5 21.5 16.6 20.7 100 87.6 12.5
Middle East 9.4 100 30.9 27.7 23.9 17.5 9.2 100 90.6 9.4
Ex USSR 1.3 100 30.0 30.2 23.0 16.8 1.5 100 94.1 5.9
ln(gdp) coeﬃcient ln(gdp) coeﬃcient
SubSAfrica 352,893 0.075* 0.063* 0.065* 0.072* 0.110* 344,442 0.066* 0.094* 0.027
Asia 428,424 -0.133* -0.157* -0.184* -0.124* -0.065* 357,618 -0.144* -0.190* -0.017
Latin America 219,666 -0.155* -0.138* -0.176* -0.160* -0.145* 215,960 -0.160* -0.169* -0.097*
Middle East 104,783 -0.246* -0.093 -0.278* -0.329* -0.353* 95,072 -0.574* -0.643* 0.094
Ex USSR 15,009 0.378 0.186 0.435 0.483 0.475 14,979 -0.146 -0.137 -0.283
Robust standard errors (s.e.) in brackets. * signiﬁcant at 5%. See notes to Table 3. The speciﬁcation estimated
corresponds to equation (3). ln(GDP) is interacted with either the wealth quartile of household or the family’s land
ownership.
4
0Table 7: Income eﬀects by location and fertility.
Zone Children under 5 in household
N Total eﬀect urban rural Total eﬀect No Yes
Total 1,000,983
mean 100 37.3 62.7 100 36.1 63.9
lgdp -0.061* -0.029* -0.081* -0.073* -0.047* -0.087*
s.e. [0.009] [0.009] [0.009] [0.009] [0.009] [0.009]
By region
% women in each category % women in each category
SubSAfrica 31.8 100 25.1 74.9 100 22.0 78.0
Asia 38.2 100 29.0 71.0 100 44.0 56.0
Latin America 19.3 100 65.7 34.3 100 39.4 60.6
Middle East 9.4 100 50.9 49.1 100 41.1 59.0
Ex USSR 1.3 100 58.9 41.1 100 62.7 37.3
ln(gdp) coeﬃcient ln(gdp) coeﬃcient
SubSAfrica 352,893 0.072* 0.098* 0.063* 0.070* 0.088* 0.065*
Asia 428,424 -0.134* -0.097* -0.149* -0.125* -0.079* -0.162*
Latin America 219,666 -0.155* -0.161* -0.144* -0.159* -0.148* -0.165*
Middle East 104,783 -0.276* -0.425* -0.122 -0.277* -0.267* -0.283*
Ex USSR 15,009 0.460 0.602 0.257 -0.195 -0.156 -0.261
Robust standard errors (s.e.) in brackets. * signiﬁcant at 5%. See notes to Table 3. The speciﬁcation
estimated corresponds to equation (3). ln(GDP) is interacted with either rural/urban location or
whether there are children under ﬁve in household.
4
1Table 8: Income eﬀects by cohort, education and fertility
Women’s level of education Children under 5 in household
Cohort N Total none some higher Total No Yes
eﬀect eﬀect
% women in each category % women in each category
20-24 18.4 100 36.3 52.4 11.3 100 18.5 81.5
25-35 44.2 100 38.8 46.6 14.6 100 26.3 73.7
36+ 37.4 100 45.1 43.1 11.9 100 56.3 43.7
ln(gdp) coeﬃcient ln(gdp) coeﬃcient
20-24 185,114
lgdp -0.060* -0.060* -0.077* 0.023 -0.051* -0.011 -0.060*
s.e. [0.022] [0.022] [0.022] [0.022] [0.022] [0.022] [0.022]
25-35 446,858
lgdp -0.081* -0.081* -0.101* -0.013 -0.077* -0.053* -0.085*
s.e. [0.014] [0.014] [0.014] [0.014] [0.014] [0.014] [0.014]
36+ 369,011
lgdp -0.111* -0.119* -0.119* -0.053* -0.113* -0.100* -0.128*
s.e. [0.015] [0.015] [0.015] [0.016] [0.015] [0.015] [0.015]
Robust standard errors (s.e.) in brackets. * signiﬁcant at 5%. See notes to Table 3.
The speciﬁcation estimated corresponds to Equation (3). ln(GDP) is interacted with
either the level of education of the index woman (as in Table 3), or whether there
are children under ﬁve in household (as in Table 7).
4
2Table 9: Evermarried women. Employment transitions
Women’s level of education
N Total eﬀect none some higher
Total
Self- employed
lgdp 855,377 -0.635* -0.685* -0.590* -0.639*
odds ratio 0.530* 0.504* 0.554* 0.528*
s.e. [0.087] [0.088] [0.088] [0.088]
Not working
lgdp 2.183* 2.165* 2.277* 1.899*
odds ratio 8.875* 8.717* 9.744* 6.680*
s.e. [0.071] [0.071] [0.071] [0.072]
By region ln(gdp) coeﬃcient
SubSAfrica
Self- employed 306,175 -3.056* -3.202* -2.891* -2.779*
odds ratio 0.047* 0.041* 0.056* 0.062*
Not working -2.504* -2.581* -2.424* -2.272*
odds ratio 0.082* 0.076* 0.089* 0.103*
Asia
Self- employed 362,594 -1.509* -1.791* -1.283* -1.295*
odds ratio 0.221* 0.167* 0.277* 0.274*
Not working -3.913* -4.129* -3.674* -3.951*
odds ratio 0.020* 0.016* 0.025* 0.019*
Latin America
Self- employed 186,608 0.532 0.287 0.499 0.772*
odds ratio 1.702 1.332 1.647 2.164*
Not working 10.393* 10.219* 10.400* 10.480*
odds ratio 32640* 27407* 32856* 35599*
Middle East
Self- employed 95,792 11.266* 10.558* 11.618* 12.342*
odds ratio 78097* 38488* 111047* 229131*
Not working -5.008* -5.402* -5.022* -3.955*
odds ratio 0.007* 0.005* 0.007* 0.019*
Ex USSR
Self- employed 14,247 39.926* 31.183* 38.967* 41.208*
odds ratio 2.186e+17* 3.487e+13* 8.376e+16* 7.878e+17*
Not working 5.847 9.792 5.421 6.390
odds ratio 346.304 17892 226.203 596.051
Robust standard errors in brackets. * signiﬁcant at 5%. See notes to Table 3. These
are multinomial logit estimates run on a sample and speciﬁcation similar to that for
equation (1).
43Table 10: Robustness checks.
Individual Country ﬁxed Unadjusted lagged quadratic Macro
Controls eﬀects and trends gdp gdp gdp shocks
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
log(gdp) -0.179* -0.067* -0.255* 1.405* -0.028

















M2 as % of GDP -0.023*
[0.002]
Robust standard errors in brackets. * signiﬁcant at 5%
Results include Africa, Asia and Latin America only. Column 2 shows the baseline model (Equation (1) in text). It
corresponds to the equation in Table 3 with the diﬀerence that the equation is estimated including interactions of
ln(GDP) with education, i.e. Equation (3).
Columns 3,4,5 are run using the speciﬁcation in column 2
1/ Net barter terms of trade (2000 = 100): The net barter terms of trade is the ratio (expressed as a percentage) of
relative export and import prices when volume is held constant
2/ Inﬂation, consumer prices (annual %)/1000
3/ Civil conﬂict with 25 to 999 battle deaths per year (minor conﬂict)
4/ Civil conﬂict with 1000 battle deaths or more per year (war)
4
4Table 11: Income eﬀects on women’s employment by women’s education and region. Sub-
Region ﬁxed eﬀects.
Total Women’s level of education
N eﬀect none some higher
(1) (2) (3) (4)
(A) 43 Countries (T≥2)
Total
lgdp 1,000,983 0.019* 0.033* -0.012* 0.082*
s.e. [0.002] [0.003] [0.002] [0.003]
By continent
SubSAfrica 352,893 0.152* 0.186* 0.109* 0.146*
Asia 428,424 -0.225* -0.215* -0.248* -0.182*
Latin America 219,666 -0.008 -0.025* -0.015 0.024*
Middle East 104,783 0.235* 0.266* 0.244* 0.132*
Ex USSR 15,009 -0.217 -0.929 -0.246 -0.178
(B) All 63 countries (T≥1)
Total
lgdp 1,065,404 0.014* 0.023* -0.014* 0.086*
s.e. [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.003]
By continent
SubSAfrica 378,145 0.068* 0.111* 0.016* 0.078*
Asia 446,423 -0.219* -0.227* -0.230* -0.162*
Latin America 240,836 -0.031* -0.050* -0.034* -0.011
Middle East 118,846 0.045 0.062* 0.042 0.004
Ex USSR 26,423 -0.122 0.008 -0.133 -0.110
Robust standard errors (s.e.) in brackets. * signiﬁcant at
5%. See notes to Table 3. The speciﬁcation estimated cor-
responds to equation (4) in text.
45Table 12: Asymmetric eﬀects.
N Total eﬀect boom recession
Total
mean 100 88.2 11.8
lgdp 1,000,983 -0.075* -0.073* -0.092*
s.e. [0.009] [0.009] [0.010]
By region
% women in each category
SubSAfrica 31.8 100 79.3 20.7
Asia 38.2 100 95.3 4.7
Latin America 19.3 100 84.4 15.6
Middle East 9.4 100 98.3 1.7
Ex USSR 1.3 100 81.8 18.2
ln(gdp) coeﬃcient
SubSAfrica 352,893 -0.026 -0.022 -0.041
Asia 428,424 -0.128* -0.124* -0.211*
Latin America 219,666 -0.078* -0.074* -0.096*
Middle East 104,783 0.090 -0.320* 21.752*
Ex USSR 15,009 -0.441 0.693 -5.454
Robust standard errors (s.e.) in brackets. * signiﬁcant at
5%. See notes to Table 3. ln(GDP) is interacted with an
indicator for recession (recession = 1 if dlgdp = ln(gdp)t −
ln(gdp)t−1 < 0 - see Section 4.4.3).
46Appendix
47Table A1: Employment rates by individual characteristics of women and men.
Women Men
All SubS. Asia Latin Middle Ex All SubS. Asia Latin Middle Ex
Africa Am. East USSR Africa Am. East USSR
Total 49.1 64.4 43.3 50.4 19.8 48.1 98.3 98.6 98.2 99.1 98.0 89.8
Cohort
20-24 39.1 56.0 31.7 35.5 10.6 25.0
25-35 49.0 64.4 43.1 49.7 19.6 44.3
36 + 54.1 69.4 49.3 57.0 23.5 57.6
Education
None 50.3 63.6 48.3 44.3 13.6 40.0 98.7 99.1 98.3 99.3 97.4 69.8
Some 47.7 64.7 41.0 46.7 16.6 41.9 98.4 98.4 98.4 99.3 98.3 89.8
Complete 50.7 71.7 34.3 64.6 45.8 56.0 97.5 97.4 97.7 98.6 98.4 89.8
Partners’ education
None 51.6 63.0 50.5 40.0 14.3 45.2
Some 49.9 65.2 46.3 47.9 17.5 43.7
Complete 43.8 66.5 30.0 60.3 31.7 53.1
Wealth quartiles
1 49.8 63.1 48.0 43.2 19.0 43.1 98.5 98.5 98.5 99.5 98.2 88.5
2 50.8 66.3 48.6 51.9 17.6 43.0 98.4 98.8 98.3 99.3 98.0 87.3
3 49.2 65.0 42.9 53.7 19.1 51.6 98.1 98.6 98.1 98.6 97.7 90.8
4 46.1 64.1 32.5 57.2 25.5 58.8 98.2 98.6 97.9 98.7 98.3 93.3
Area
Urban 45.9 62.3 33.5 54.5 21.0 49.8 97.9 98.0 97.8 98.9 98.0 89.5
Rural 51.1 65.1 47.2 43.1 18.6 46.3 98.6 98.9 98.4 99.5 98.1 90.0
Marital Status
Not married 65.1 70.3 64.4 68.1 29.6 63.6
Married 47.4 63.7 41.8 47.3 19.1 46.2
Children under 5 in hh
No 51.7 67.0 48.1 57.9 24.7 55.7 97.8 98.3 97.7 99.1 97.3 89.3
Yes 47.7 63.6 39.5 45.7 16.7 37.2 98.6 98.7 98.5 99.2 98.5 90.4
Continued on next page
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8Table A1: Employment rates by individual characteristics of women and men. Continued
Women Men
All SubS. Asia Latin Middle Ex All SubS. Asia Latin Middle Ex
Africa Am. East USSR Africa Am. East USSR
log(GDP p.c.) quintile
1 65.9 64.3 79.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 99.2 99.2 99.3
2 47.5 75.4 40.0 0 8.3 50.0 98.2 99.4 97.8 100.0 93.3
3 49.3 54.0 16.9 55.6 13.0 45.9 95.8 97.5 97.3 97.9 94.1 87.0
4 37.9 70.7 46.3 46.0 18.6 53.2 98.3 92.5 98.7 98.6 97.9 96.0
5 48.9 44.8 60.5 52.3 28.0 0.0 99.0 92.8 99.7 99.5 99.5
Asymmetry
booms (dlgdp1/ > 0) 48.5 65.4 43.3 50.4 20.5 45.8 98.4 98.9 98.1 99.2 98.2 87.4
recessions (dlgdp1/ < 0)53.5 60.8 42.1 50.9 9.5 56.0 98.0 97.7 99.9 98.5 96.2 97.9
Financial Development
M2 as % GPD
1 63.6 67.4 70.6 8.3 43.8 97.6 98.6 98.3 100.0 88.6
2 57.8 61.4 57.4 31.1 64.0 98.8 98.8 99.5 99.6 89.4
3 47.0 63.9 24.8 45.3 14.0 98.9 98.7 98.4 99.3 94.1
4 40.4 58.5 43.3 53.6 18.1 98.0 97.4 98.1 97.7 97.9
Private credit
1 61.4 65.7 70.6 11.0 38.9 97.9 99.1 98.3 97.2 84.7
2 63.5 71.0 59.6 31.1 58.1 98.5 98.5 99.2 99.6 93.0
3 38.6 51.0 37.2 34.9 98.2 98.8 97.9 99.0
4 42.8 47.6 54.9 50.3 18.1 98.6 98.6 98.7 99.1 97.9
Notes: Evermarried women older than 20 years old
Levels of education:
none - if 0 years of education
some - less than complete secondary
higher - complete secondary or more
1/ dlgdp = ln(gdp)t − ln(gdp)t−1
4
9Table A2: Distribution of women in each region by individual characteristics.
All women SubS. Africa Asia Latin Am. Middle East Ex USSR
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100
Cohort
20-24 18.3 20.5 18.7 15.9 15.1 13.7
25-35 44.3 46.0 44.2 42.7 44.3 37.9
36 + 37.4 33.6 37.1 41.4 40.7 48.4
Education
None 39.7 52.2 43.7 12.6 47.8 0.2
Some 47.1 44.2 42.6 64.8 36.3 56.0
Complete 13.2 3.6 13.7 22.7 15.9 43.8
Partners’ Education
None 28.4 43.7 25.4 10.0 33.7 0.2
Some 50.9 47.8 49.2 63.2 42.4 53.5
Complete 20.7 8.5 25.4 26.9 23.9 46.3
Wealth quartiles
1 33.1 38.2 30.5 31.3 31.3 29.7
2 23.9 21.4 22.1 29.7 27.0 27.1
3 22.6 20.9 24.1 21.9 23.5 24.3
4 20.3 19.5 23.4 17.1 18.2 18.8
Area
Urban 37.5 26.4 28.7 64.5 49.2 50.5
Rural 62.5 73.6 71.3 35.5 50.8 49.6
Marital Status
Not married 9.75 11.0 6.5 15.1 7.0 10.8
Married 90.25 89.0 93.5 84.9 93.0 89.2
Children under 5 in hh
No 36.1 22.7 43.8 39.0 39.1 58.9
Yes 63.9 77.3 56.2 61.0 60.9 41.1
Working
No 50.9 35.6 56.7 49.6 80.2 51.9
Yes 49.1 64.4 43.3 50.4 19.8 48.1
Occupation
not working 42.0 29.1 50.2 35.0 77.1 45.0
agriculture 25.9 39.2 28.4 9.6 7.5 11.0
non agriculture 32.2 31.8 21.4 55.5 15.4 44.0
Type of work
not working 56.2 38.3 64.0 54.2 87.7 52.3
self employed 25.0 50.1 10.8 24.8 2.8 5.5
paid employee 18.9 11.6 25.3 21.0 9.5 42.2
Notes: Evermarried women older than 20 years old
Levels of education:
none - if 0 years of education
some - less than complete secondary
higher - complete secondary or more
50Table A3: Summary statistics.
Variable Description Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Source
working respondent currently working (v714) 1,266,463 0.489 0.500 0 1 DHS
lgdp log(real GDP percapita - constant US$ 2000)1,265,016 13.273 0.833 11.687 15.471 WDI
cohort1 woman is 20-24 years old 1,266,463 0.180 0.384 0 1 DHS
cohort2 woman is 25-35 years old 1,266,463 0.444 0.497 0 1 DHS
cohort3 woman is 36 years old or older 1,266,463 0.376 0.484 0 1 DHS
noeduc woman - no education 1,265,566 0.385 0.486 0 1 DHS
someeduc woman - some educ 1,265,566 0.480 0.500 0 1 DHS
compleduc woman - higher educ 1,265,566 0.135 0.342 0 1 DHS
noeduc h partner - no education 1,219,287 0.273 0.445 0 1 DHS
someeduc h partner - some educ 1,219,287 0.513 0.500 0 1 DHS
compleduc h partner - higher educ 1,219,287 0.214 0.410 0 1 DHS
chunder5 number of children 5 and under 1,266,463 1.170 1.251 0 21 DHS
married woman is married or living together 1,265,721 0.896 0.305 0 1 DHS
rural woman lives in rural area 1,266,463 0.594 0.491 0 1 DHS
hhhead woman is household (hh) head 1,266,463 0.106 0.308 0 1 DHS
hhsize number of adult members in hh 1,266,463 5.299 3.136 1 66 DHS
wealthqa1 hh wealth - quartile 1 1,260,478 0.329 0.470 0 1 DHS. Authors’ calculations
wealthqa2 hh wealth - quartile 2 1,260,478 0.232 0.422 0 1 DHS. Authors’ calculations
wealthqa3 hh wealth - quartile 3 1,260,478 0.220 0.414 0 1 DHS. Authors’ calculations
wealthqa4 hh wealth - quartile 4 1,260,478 0.219 0.413 0 1 DHS. Authors’ calculations
pwomworkage % women of working age 1,266,463 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.003 DHS. Authors’ calculations
ruralpop per rural (% of total) population 1,266,463 0.622 0.178 0.192 0.944 WDI
q1 Interview was in ﬁrst quarter 1,266,463 0.260 0.439 0 1
q2 Interview was in second quarter 1,266,463 0.288 0.453 0 1
q3 Interview was in third quarter 1,266,463 0.196 0.397 0 1
q4 Interview was in last quarter 1,266,463 0.255 0.436 0 1
rain dev Rain shocks 1,059,296 -0.243 0.802 -9.082 1.157 FAO
termstrade Net barter terms of trade (2000 = 100) 1,129,505 1.053 0.202 0.596 2.059 WDI
inﬂation Inﬂation, consumer prices (annual %)/1000 1,232,587 0.018 0.059 -0.005 1.097 WDI
minor conﬂict deaths¡1000 1,266,463 0.277 0.448 0 1 International Peace Research Institute







woman is 25-35 y-o 0.089*
[0.001]
woman is 36y-o or older 0.116*
[0.002]
woman - some educ -0.035*
[0.001]
woman - higher educ 0.059*
[0.002]
partner - some educ -0.008*
[0.001]
partner - higher educ -0.062*
[0.002]
No. children under 5 -0.017*
[0.000]




woman is hh head 0.068*
[0.002]
No. adult members in hh -0.001*
[0.000]
hh wealth - quartile 2 0.029*
[0.001]
hh wealth - quartile 3 0.019*
[0.001]
hh wealth - quartile 4 -0.013*
[0.002]
% women working age -115.628*
[8.241]
rural (% of total) pop -2.252*
[0.196]
Interview was in second quarter 0.013
[0.001]*
Interview was in third quarter 0.017
[0.002]*






Robust standard errors in brackets. * signiﬁcant at
5%. Results are from the baseline model (Equa-
tion (1) in text) and include Africa, Asia and Latin
America only. See notes to Table 3.
52Table A5: Income eﬀects on women’s employment by women’s education and region. Region
ﬁxed eﬀects.
Total Women’s level of education
N eﬀect none some higher
(1) (2) (3) (4)
(A) 43 Countries (T≥2)
Total
lgdp 1,000,983 -0.046* -0.043* -0.072* 0.036*
s.e. [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.003]
By continent
SubSAfrica 352,893 -0.023* 0.035* -0.093* -0.080*
Asia 428,424 -0.171* -0.168* -0.192* -0.120*
Latin America 219,666 -0.149* -0.160* -0.157* -0.122*
Middle East 104,783 0.235* 0.266* 0.244* 0.132*
Ex USSR 15,009 -0.217 -0.929 -0.246 -0.178
(B) All 63 countries (T≥1)
Total
lgdp 1,065,404 -0.064* -0.063* -0.089* 0.024*
s.e. [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002]
By continent
SubSAfrica 378,145 -0.069* -0.015* -0.132* -0.095*
Asia 446,423 -0.088* -0.105* -0.092* -0.022*
Latin America 240,836 -0.033* -0.057* -0.033* -0.020*
Middle East 118,846 0.045 0.062* 0.042 0.004
Ex USSR 26,423 -0.122 0.008 -0.133 -0.110
Robust standard errors (s.e.) in brackets. * signiﬁcant at
5%. See notes to Table 3. The speciﬁcation estimated cor-
responds to equation (5) in text.
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A Data Appendix
This section presents further information on the sources and deﬁnitions of the variables
used in the analysis. The Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS) are available at
www.measuredhs.com, where information on survey design and sampling strategy is available.
The Julian and Nepali calendar. The Julian calendar is 7 years and 8 months behind
the Gregorian calendar. The cutoﬀ date for asking health questions is normally in Meskerem
which roughly corresponds to September (see Chapter 8 of the 2000 and 2005 DHS reports for
Ethiopia). The Nepali calendar is 56 years and 9 months ahead the Gregorian calendar. The
cutoﬀ date for asking health questions is normally in Baisakh which corresponds to April (see
Chapter 8 of the 2001 and 2006 DHS reports for Nepal).
Employment (the dependent variable): Source: DHS. Women are asked the following
question: “As you know, some women take up jobs for which they are paid in cash or kind.
Others sell things, have a small business or work on the family farm or in the family business.
Are you currently [/in the last 7 days] doing any of these things or any other work? (y/n)”.
Our employment variable is the response to this question. Women who work were classiﬁed
into two categories, paid employee and self-employed using three DHS variables. Every women
was asked (i) whether she worked for a family member, for someone else or was self-employed
(v719) and (ii) whether she received cash for this work (v720)21 or (iii) whether she received
21Available from 1990-1999
54cash for her work, or was paid in kind, or in cash and kind, or not paid (v741)22. As a check on
the DHS data, we obtained employment rates as country-level means and compared these with
the labour force participation rates for the 15+ population recorded in the World Development
Indicators of the World Bank (http://publications.worldbank.org/WDI/) (see Figure A1). The
labor force participation rate is deﬁned as the proportion of the population (ages 15+) that is
economically active, i.e. who supply labor for the production of goods and services.
GDP Per capita GDP in constant 2000 USD from the World Development Indicators (WDI)
of the World Bank (http://publications.worldbank.org/WDI/). We adjust GDP for month of
interview. For example, if a woman is interviewed in December 1992, then she is matched
to GDP for the calendar year Jan-Dec 1992. If she is interviewed January 1993 then she is
matched to GDP constructed as 1/12(GDP in 1993)+11/12(GDP in 1992), and so on.
Education: Source: DHS. We identiﬁed cut-oﬀ points for the number of years of education
needed to complete primary and secondary school by (sub-)regions, and created the variables
accordingly. People complete secondary school when they have 12 years of education in Sub-
Saharan Africa, Middle East, Asia Paciﬁc and Central America and the Caribbean; 11 years in
South America and 10 years in South Asia. For women who do not have a partner at the time
of the survey (i.e who are not “currently married”) the indicators for partner’s education are
set to zero and an indicator for current marital status is included in the model.
Wealth index. Source: DHS. The index is calculated as the ﬁrst principal component
using DHS information on the household’s ownership of radio, fridge, bike, motorbike, car
and television set, the type of toilet (ﬂush, pit, none) and whether the household has electric-
ity. Agricultural land was not included in the index as only women who reported working in
agriculture were asked about land ownership.
Rural population as % of total population. Source: WDI of the World Bank
Rainfall Rainfall data are obtained from the Food and Agriculture Organization of the
United Nations (FAO) (http://geonetwork3.fao.org/climpag/agroclimdb en.php). We con-
structed rainfall shocks as deviations from the mean of country rainfall across 1985-2005 ex-
cluding the year of interview.
Net barter terms of trade (2000 = 100). Source: WDI of the World Bank. Net barter
terms of trade are the ratio of the export price index to the corresponding import price index
measured relative to the base year 2000.
Inﬂation, consumer prices (annual %). Source: WDI of the World Bank. Inﬂation
as measured by the consumer price index reﬂects the annual percentage change in the cost to
the average consumer of acquiring a ﬁxed basket of goods and services that may be ﬁxed or
changed at speciﬁed intervals, such as yearly. The Laspeyres formula is generally used.
22Available from 2000-2006. Payment in kind or in kind and cash is considered paid work.
55Civil War Data on civil conﬂict and war were obtained from the International Peace Re-
search Institute (http://www.prio.no/CSCW/Datasets/Armed-Conﬂict/UCDP-PRIO/). Civil
conﬂict is deﬁned as 25 to 999 battle deaths per year and war as at least 1000 battle deaths per
year. Conﬂicts might be internal (within the same country) or external (between countries). An
external conﬂict counted as one for each of the countries involved in the conﬂict. We identiﬁed
more than one conﬂict for some years in Ethiopia, India, Niger, Nigeria, Pakistan, Philippines,
South Africa, Sri Lanka and Turkey, the most critical conﬂict (a war, or cumulated war) was
selected as the main conﬂict in each country.
A.1 Distribution of women by individual characteristics
Table A2 shows the distribution of women by individual characteristics. About 18% of women
are of age 20-24, 44% are 25-35 and 38% are 35-49 years. On average almost 40% of women are
uneducated, 13% have secondary or higher education and the rest are at some intermediate level.
Amongst their partners, 28% are uneducated and 21% have secondary or higher education. The
age distribution is similar across regions but the education distribution is not. African women
are much less educated than Latin American women and Asia lies between. As many as 52%
of African women are uneducated and only 3.6% have at least secondary education. In Latin
America, the corresponding ﬁgures are 12.6% and 22.7%. Across our sample, 62.5% of women
live in rural locations, Africa is the least urbanised of the three regions and Latin America the
most. 90% of all ever-married women are married and 64% have at least one child under the
age of ﬁve at the time of the survey. African and Latin American women are much less likely
to be (currently) married than Asian women. Self employment is concentrated in agriculture
and sales, the share of agriculture being largest in Africa and smallest in Latin America23.
B Media coverage: women’s participation in recessions
Overview: The UK Guardian newspaper and Channel 4 news suggest that in this, as in the
1980s recession, part-time work amongst women is on the rise even as male unemployment is
rising while the UK Trade Union Congress suggests that women may do worse in this recession
than before and this is echoed in a report for the US. Based upon a survey of the UK corporate
world, The Times newspaper argues that women are exiting employment twice as fast as women
but that this is voluntary. A piece by the international news editor of The Star similarly captures
23There is a distinction between self- and informal employment. “Informal” is probably best described as
unregulated. So while informal work will typically encompass self employment it also tends to include paid
employment. Development economists and practitioners are increasingly interested in each category, informal
sector employment and self employment; witness the keynote address on this and the several sessions ded-
icated to it at the 2009 Employment and Development Conference organised by the World Bank and IZA
(http://www.iza.org/conference ﬁles/worldb2009/izawb2009program.pdf)
56conﬂicting views of the impact of the current recession on women in poorer countries. Perusal
of these seemingly alternative viewpoints suggests that distinguishing part-time from full-time
work and the status of married from unmarried women brings them much closer than they may
appear. The press articles referred to are below.
“Though the last unemployment statistics show the number of women in full-time work to
have fallen by 53,000 in the last quarter compared with a drop of 36,000 for men, oﬃcials at the
Department for Work and Pensions [UK] point to an increase in part-time employment among
women, a higher male redundancy rate, and a higher male unemployment rate (The Guardian
2009).” “The recession of the early 80s had a devastating eﬀect on predominantly male working-
class employment, but it wasn’t too bad for their daughters, who began to enter the workforce
like never before, especially in areas like ﬁnancial services and retail (Channel 4 News 2008)”.
“So far it looks as though women’s jobs will be aﬀected more than in previous recessions Since
the start of the 2008 the female redundancy rate has increased by 2.3 percentage points, almost
double the rate of male increase. If there were a major drive to cut public spending even more
women would ﬁnd their jobs were at risk, as there are more women than men employed in the
public sector A quarter of households are single parent in the UK and 90% of these are headed
by women (Trade Union Congress 2009).”
“In January, reports that women were losing their jobs twice as fast as men led to speculation
that they were being illegally targeted by employers attempting to avoid the costs of maternity
leave or ﬂexible working. Yet women are choosing to leave lucrative careers by taking voluntary
redundancy, the research shows (The Times 2009)”.
In contrast to previous recessions, in which women have typically fared somewhat better
than men, early signs indicate that this recession is hitting women harder than menThe eﬀects
of this reduction will be compounded by the fact that women and female?headed households
are generally less able to absorb the eﬀects of a recession than their male counterparts (US
Senate 2008).
Although the global downturn began in the ﬁnancial sector, dominated by men, it is now
bearing down on women [in developing countries], most often found in low-wage and part-time
jobs.Along with increased risk there is great opportunity for women in the current crisis (The
Star 2009).
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